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Abstract in English 
This paper examines the impact of early tracking on enrollment in and completion of higher 
education. We compare pupils that are directly tracked in lower general secondary education 
(‘mavo’) to pupils that postpone their choice of education level by entering secondary education 
in a combined first-grade class. Potential self-selection problems are addressed in two ways. 
First of all, using micro data allows us to control for a large set of individual background 
characteristics including tests of cognitive ability. Second, we exploit differences in regional 
supply of particular school types. The estimates show that early tracking has a detrimental 
effect on enrollment in and completion of higher education for pupils who leave primary 
education with a mavo advice. In addition, we find no evidence that pupils who leave primary 
education with a higher general secondary education (‘havo’) advice would be negatively 
affected by being in a comprehensive class together with the mavo advice pupils. Enrollment in 
and completion of higher education can be increased by stimulating participation in combined 
first-grade classes that keep pupils with a mavo or havo advice together for an additional one or 
two years.  
 
Key words: early tracking 
Abstract in Dutch 
Dit paper onderzoekt het effect van vroege selectie op de deelname aan en het afronden van het 
hoger onderwijs. Hiervoor vergelijken we leerlingen die vroeg geselecteerd zijn (d.w.z. direct 
naar een categorale mavo gaan) met leerlingen die 1 of 2 jaar later geselecteerd worden door het 
volgen van een gecombineerde brugklas. Er wordt op twee manieren met mogelijke zelfselectie 
omgegaan. We controleren voor een grote verzameling individuele achtergrondkenmerken zoals 
testscores op cognitieve vaardigheden. Daarnaast maken we gebruik van verschillen in 
regionaal aanbod van bepaalde typen scholen. De schattingen laten zien dat vroege selectie een 
negatief effect heeft op de deelname aan en het afronden van het hoger onderwijs voor de 
leerlingen met een mavo-advies. We vinden bovendien geen aanwijzing dat leerlingen met een 
havo-advies een negatieve invloed zouden ondervinden van leerlingen met een mavo-advies in 
de gecombineerde brugklas. De deelname aan het hoger onderwijs en het aantal hoger 
opgeleiden in Nederland kunnen vergroot worden door het stimuleren van deelname aan 
gecombineerde brugklassen waarin leerlingen met een mavo- of havo-advies één of twee jaar 
bij elkaar gehouden worden. 
 
Steekwoorden: vroege selectie 
 
A comprehensive summary is available from www.cpb.nl.   4 
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Preface 
In Dutch education, pupils are tracked into different school types directly after leaving primary 
school, at age twelve. According to the OECD, this relatively early timing of tracking is a 
potential constraint for the growth of higher education participation. This study examines the 
impact of early tracking on enrollment in and completion of higher education. The research was 
executed as a part of the so-called ‘experiment budget’, which was raised by the Ministry of 
Education in 2007. This budget facilitates experimental studies in the field of education with the 
aim to contribute to more ‘evidence-based policy’.  
 
The document has been written by Roel van Elk, Marc van der Steeg and Dinand Webbink. 
First of all, the authors are grateful to the members of the advisory committee: Paul van Oijen, 
Vera Pieterman and Tim Schokker from the Ministry of Education, Niels Achterberg and 
Jurgen Geelhoed from the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and Maarten Cornet from the Ministry 
of Finance. Furthermore, we thank Jaap Roeleveld (SCO-Kohnstamm Institute), Hans Kuyper 
(GION), Maurice Krul (UvA) and Ib Watterreus (Education Council of the Netherlands) for 
their help and worthful comments. The study also gained from the valuable comments of Pierre 
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Summary 
In the Netherlands, both the level and growth of participation in higher education is low 
compared to other rich countries (CPB, 2005). According to the OECD
1, the early tracking 
regime in the Netherlands causes a severe constraint for the growth of higher education 
participation. It states that ‘In the end, postponement of the present early tracking regime seems 
inevitable, although this is a major change in the way Dutch society thinks of itself’ (OECD, 
2007, p.38).  
 
Early tracking makes that pupils are grouped by ability in different school types and that they 
face different peers. This may have major consequences for future educational outcomes. This 
paper examines the impact of early tracking on enrollment in and completion of higher 
education. 
 
We use a within country analysis in which we exploit a special feature of the Dutch education 
system. At the start of secondary education, schools in the Netherlands offer different types of 
first-grade classes. In some schools, pupils are directly tracked into categorial classes of a 
certain education level. Other schools offer one- or two-year combined classes, in which pupils 
are kept together before they are tracked in a particular school type. This causes variation in the 
timing of tracking which we exploit to analyze the effects of early tracking.  
 
A concern regarding our analysis is that pupils may self-select into categorial or comprehensive 
classes. We address this potential problem first by including a large set of covariates. Using 
micro data of pupils allows us to control for various individual background characteristics 
including test scores on arithmetic, language and information processing. Second, we adopt an 
instrumental variables approach in which we exploit exogenous variation in tracking driven by 
the supply of different school types in a pupil’s region.  
 
The estimates show that early tracking has a negative effect on participation in higher 
education. Early tracking decreases the probability of both enrollment in and completion of 
higher education by around 4%- points for pupils with a mavo advice. In the cohorts of pupils 
that enter secondary education in 1989 and in 1993, average enrollment and completion of 
higher education for the tracked pupils is around 22 and 35%, respectively. Hence, pupils with a 
mavo advice that are in a categorial mavo can increase their probabilities to enroll and complete 
higher education to around 26 and 39%, respectively, by entering secondary education in a 
combined mavo-havo(-vwo) class. Additional analyses suggest that while pupils with a mavo 
advice gain from being in a comprehensive class, higher ability pupils do not experience 
 
1 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.   10 
negative consequences from this. This points to an inefficiency of the early tracking regime 
with respect to participation in higher education. 
 
Our study supports the OECD conclusion on the Dutch education system that the early tracking 
regime has a negative effect on participation in higher education. Policies that stimulate 
participation in comprehensive classes for mavo pupils can raise enrollment and completion of 
higher education.  
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1  Introduction 
In the Netherlands, both the level and growth of participation in higher education is low 
compared to other rich countries (CPB, 2005). According to the OECD, the early tracking 
regime in the Netherlands causes a severe constraint for the growth of higher education 
participation. It states that ‘In the end, postponement of the present early tracking regime seems 
inevitable, although this is a major change in the way Dutch society thinks of itself’ (OECD, 
2007, p.38). Considering the commitment of the Dutch government to the Lisbon goal to raise 
participation in higher education, an evaluation of the effects of early tracking is highly relevant 
from a policy perspective.   
 
We define tracking as the allocation of students into differing ability schools or classes. In 
Dutch education system, pupils are selected into different school types directly after leaving 
primary school, at age twelve. This is early compared to other countries like the United States, 
Canada, the United Kingdom and the Scandinavian countries who keep their entire lower 
secondary school system comprehensive. Early tracking makes that pupils are grouped by 
ability in different school types and that they face different peers. This may have major 
consequences for future educational outcomes. This paper examines the impact of early 
tracking on enrollment in (and completion of) higher education. 
 
Various potential effects of early tracking on educational outcomes have been suggested.
2  On 
the one hand, proponents of tracking often use the argument that homogeneous classrooms, 
with a lower ability variance, allow a more focused curriculum. Teaching becomes easier as the 
course material can be better adapted to the needs of the pupils. An appropriate pace of 
instruction, without losing the lowest ability pupils or boring the best ability pupils in class, 
contributes to an optimal learning environment for all pupils. 
On the other hand, critics of tracking argue that there is a positive relationship between 
average pupil ability in class and individual performance. According to this view, high ability 
pupils benefit from tracking at the expense of low ability pupils. This may be induced by either 
teacher quality effects or peer effects. If better teachers prefer to teach relatively high ability 
classes, teacher sorting may result in a higher quality of education in these classes.  
Low ability pupils may benefit from the interaction with higher ability pupils. If peer effects 
are nonlinear, this gives rise to efficiency gains. In case of linear peer effects, however, tracking 
would not have an impact on educational outcomes (Argys et al., 1996). In the empirical 
literature there is no consensus yet on the existence and the size of peer group effects and the 
role of peers in the discussion on early tracking remains disputed.
3  
 
2 An overview of the literature can be found in Van de Werfhorst and Mijs (2007). Epple et al. (2002) and Brunello and 
Giannini (2004) present some theoretical models of school tracking. 
3 Some recent studies on peer effects, which also address issues like the reflection problem and self-selection into groups of 
peers, are Hoxby (2000) and Sacerdote (2001).   12 
Besides effects driven by the composition of classes, there can be effects due to institutional 
differences. In an early tracking regime it may be difficult for a pupil, once being assigned to a 
particular education level, to change tracks. A comprehensive system is more flexible as pupils 
keep the same opportunities until the time a selection is made. Tracking pupils at an early age 
implies more uncertainty with respect to the pupils’ true capabilities and hence a higher risk of 
mistakenly sending them to the wrong school type.  
 
It is difficult to empirically identify causal effects of early tracking. Firstly, there is often little 
variation in the timing of tracking within a particular education system. As a consequence, an 
analysis within a country or state is often not feasible. Pupils in a specific education system are 
generally tracked at a predetermined moment in their education career, at a particular age. 
Secondly, when using cross-country variation in tracking it is hard to control for other 
differences between countries.
4 It is difficult to disentangle the effect of tracking from the 
impact of other differences between education systems. 
 
Ariga and Brunello (2007) study the effect of the experienced tracking length on performance 
of young adults in a standardized cognitive test. They use cross-country data and distinguish the 
total years of completed education in ‘years spent in a comprehensive system’ and ‘years spent 
in a tracking system’. The years spent in a tracking system depend both on exogenous between-
country variation and some within-country variation caused by age variation, pupils dropping 
out of school and curriculum differences. Self-selection problems are addressed by an 
instrumental variables approach in which the years of tracking are instrumented by dummy 
variables for pupils that stopped school because of financial constraints, family reasons, or 
because of personal constraints like illness. Their instrumental variables estimates suggest that 
there is a positive contribution of tracking to performance.  
Hanushek and Woessman (2006) use a difference-in-differences approach in a cross-country 
setup to identify the effect of an early tracking regime on standardized test scores. They match 
international primary school tests to secondary school tests and compare achievement 
differences in test scores across countries. An education system is defined as a tracking regime 
if pupils are tracked before the age at which the secondary school test is performed. They find 




4 Another potential problem in a cross-country approach is the endogeneity of the choice for a particular tracking regime 
itself. 
5 Hanushek and Woessman use the PIRLS/TIMMS tests (which are executed by the IEA) as well as the PISA test scores 
(executed by the OECD) and assume that differences between these tests can be neglected. Recently, Jakubowski (2007) 
argued that the differences in design of these tests, however, may affect the results. While PISA  measures achievement of 
pupils aged 15 (independent of their grade), PIRLS/TIMMS measures achievement in specific grades (independent of age). 
Jakubowski concludes that there is no evidence for early tracking to increase inequality when comparing pupils of the same 
age and grade.   13 
Figlio and Page (2002) investigate the effect of tracking on achievement growth in math test 
scores between the 8
th and 10
th grade for different ability groups of students. They divide the 
students according to the 8
th grade test score into top, middle and bottom thirds of the 
distribution and estimate separate regressions for each of these subsets in which they exploit 
variation in tracking across schools.
6 They find no significant effect in each of these regressions 
and interpret this as evidence that tracking does not harm the low-ability students. The results 
from additional two-stage least squares estimations in which tracking is instrumented by several 
interaction terms of variables that provide incentives for schools to track (like state academic 
requirements for graduation and the number of schools in the county), suggest that low ability 
students may actually gain from tracking. 
The discussion on inequality is often related to socio-economic background. Brunello and 
Checchi (2007) focus on the interaction between family background an tracking. They argue 
that outcome variables like test scores at secondary school may substantially over-estimate or 
under-estimate the overall impact of tracking on schooling and labor market outcomes if these 
effects are temporarily or cumulate over time. Therefore they use a variety of outcome variables 
including educational attainment and some labor market outcomes. They use cross country data 
for different cohorts of pupils and focus on the impact of an interaction variable of family 
background with tracking.
7 They do not use a difference-in-differences approach, but include 
many covariates including country-by-cohort dummies and interactions between family 
background and potential confounding factors.
8 They find some evidence that tracking 
reinforces the role of family background and thereby reduces quality of opportunities with 
respect to educational attainment and labor market outcomes.
9  
Schuetz et al. (2005) also find that early tracking accentuates the impact of family 
background and increases the dispersion of student achievement. They use a similar approach in 
which they investigate the effect of the interaction of family background with an indicator of 
school tracking (for which they take the age of selection into different tracks) on test scores of 
pupils in over 50 countries.  
 
6 Strictly speaking, the US has a comprehensive school system and employs streaming within schools, which is a milder 
form of ability grouping. While tracking implies that students are placed in different school types, streaming implies that only 
particular courses are taught at different levels of complexity. Often, this distinction is ignored in the existing literature. 
 A problem in the US studies, however, is that there does not exist a unique definition of tracking, as streaming can be 
applied in various ways and to different extents. Figlio and Page include tracking as a dummy for whether the principal 
reports that the school tracks. In addition, they do some sensitivity tests in which they use several alternative definitions of 
tracking.  
7 Based on some theoretical considerations Brunello and Checchi use two indicators for tracking, which are the time spent in 
a tracked school and the share of pupils enrolled in a vocational track. This idea underlying this last indicator is that changes 
in the share of enrollment affect peer group effects through changes in average ability.  
8 The inclusion of the country-by-cohort dummies makes that the direct effect of tracking cannot be estimated.  
9 They do, however, not find this effect with respect to literacy and on-the-job training. Moreover, the empirical findings are 
less clear for the indicator ‘share in vocational education’.    14 
These empirical findings suggest that disadvantaged pupils experience relatively more negative 
effects from an early tracking regime.
10 According to the OECD (2006) the early tracking 
system in the Netherlands is a possible determinant of the low participation in higher education 
among immigrants.  
 
This paper abstracts from studying equality issues and focuses solely on efficiency effects of 
early tracking with respect to educational attainment. The critique of the OECD on the early 
tracking system in the Netherlands serves as a starting point and we address the question 
whether there is a detrimental effect of early tracking on enrollment in higher education.  
Our empirical strategy differs from the previously discussed studies. We use a within 
country analysis in which we exploit a special feature of the Dutch education system. At the 
start of secondary education schools in the Netherlands offer different types of first grade 
classes. In some schools, pupils are directly tracked into categorial classes of a certain education 
level. Other schools offer one- or two-year combined classes, in which pupils are kept together 
before they are tracked in a particular school type. Hence, after leaving primary school, pupils 
can either be subject to an early tracking regime (when they enter a categorial class) or to a 
comprehensive system (when they enter a combined class). This causes variation in the timing 
of tracking which we exploit to analyze the effects of early tracking within one country. This 
approach ensures that other features of the education system are equal among all pupils.   
A concern regarding our analysis is self-selection of pupils into categorial or comprehensive 
classes. We address this potential problem first by including a large set of covariates. Using 
micro data of pupils allows us to control for various individual background characteristics 
including test scores on arithmetic, language and information processing that proxy ability. 
Second, we adopt an instrumental variable approach in which we exploit exogenous variation in 
tracking driven by the supply of different school types in a pupil’s region.  
Both ordinary least-squares (OLS) and instrumental variables (IV) estimations show that 
early tracking has a negative impact on participation in higher education. Early tracking 
decreases the probability of participation in higher education with around 4%- points for the 
relevant group.  
 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses our empirical strategy including the 
way of exploiting differences in the timing of tracking and the identification issue. Section 3 
describes the data and section 4 presents the main estimation results. Section 5 presents an 
additional analysis on a more recent time period, after a change in Dutch education system. In 
section 6 we check the robustness of the main results. Section 7 presents some analyses for 
 
10 A related, but different issue is that admission to certain tracks is not only based on perceived student ability but also on 
socio-economic background characteristics like ethnicity (Driessen, 2006). This would imply that disadvantaged people are 
not offered the same opportunities a priori.  
   15 
pupils with differing school advices to provide a view on the total efficiency consequences of 
early tracking. Finally, section 8 concludes and discusses potential policy implications. 
   16   17 
2  Empirical Strategy 
2.1  Variation in the timing of tracking in Dutch education 
In order to analyze the effects of early tracking, we would like to compare the outcomes of 
pupils that are subject to an early tracking regime with the outcomes of those who are not. 
Although from an international perspective Dutch educational system as a whole is considered 
to be an early tracking regime,
11 there exists some variation in the timing at which pupils are 
placed in a certain track. At the start of secondary education, schools in the Netherlands offer 
different types of first-grade classes. In some schools, pupils of age twelve are directly tracked 
into categorial classes of a certain education level. Other schools offer one- or two-year 
combined classes, in which pupils are kept together before they are tracked in a particular 
school type. Hence, pupils entering secondary education in a combined class postpone their 
choice of school type with at least one year. This difference causes some variation in the timing 
of tracking, which we can exploit to analyze effects of early tracking by comparing educational 
outcomes of  pupils who enter secondary education in a categorial class (the ‘tracked’ pupils) to 
those who enter in a combined class (the ‘non-tracked’). Strictly speaking, we investigate the 
effect of being tracked one or two years earlier.  
 
Secondary education in the Netherlands consisted of four tracks in 1989: ‘lbo’ (pre-vocational 
secondary education), ‘mavo’ (lower general secondary education), ‘havo’ (higher general 
secondary education) and ‘vwo’ (pre-university education).  In 1999, ‘lbo’ and ‘mavo’ were 
combined into one track called ‘vmbo’. Since our analyses will primarily concentrate on the 
cohorts of 1989 and 1993, we choose to use the terms ‘lbo’ and ‘mavo’ instead of ‘vmbo’ from 
now on. 
Higher education in the Netherlands is offered in two types of institutions: research 
universities, which offer research oriented programmes (‘wo’) and universities of applied 
sciences, which offer programmes of higher professional education (‘hbo’) which prepare 
students for particular professions. 
 
The minimum access requirements for higher education are a havo degree or a level 4 degree of 
‘mbo’ (upper secondary vocational education).
12 Hence, pupils who have completed havo or 
vwo are qualified for access to higher education, while pupils with a mavo degree can not 
directly enroll. 
 
11 See for example Hanushek and Woessman (2006). 
12 More specifically, for access to wo students are required to have a vwo degree or to have completed the first year of an 
hbo programme. For access to hbo, students are required to have a havo degree or to have a (level 4)  mbo degree. Mbo 
programmes are offered in four levels (1 to 4). Only completion of the programme at level 4 qualifies pupils for access to 
hbo.    18 
We interpret all pupils who enter education in a stream that does not give direct access to higher 
education (mavo and lower) as being assigned to a low track. Similarly, all pupils who enter 
secondary education in a havo or higher are assigned to a high track. Both groups of pupils can 
be considered to be subject to an ‘early tracking regime’. 
The pupils who enter some combined class that consists of at least mavo-havo postpone their 
choice of being assigned to either a low or a high track.
13 Those can be considered to be subject 
to a ‘comprehensive system’. The comprehensive classes keep pupils together for an additional 
one or two years. 
 
In our analysis, we primarily focus on pupils that leave primary education with a ‘mavo’ advice 
and compare educational outcomes for those who are immediately tracked in a categorial mavo 
to those who postpone their choice by entering a combined mavo-havo or mavo-havo-vwo 
class.
14 
15 Hence, we select a homogeneous group with respect to ability and compare the 
subsample of this group that flows into a low track to the subsample that flows into a 
comprehensive class. This group seems most interesting considering the critique of the OESO 
as the former subsample does not qualify for direct access to higher education. If early tracking 
would have a detrimental effect on participation in higher education, the mavo advice pupils 
who are tracked early are likely to be the group who experience the most negative effects of 
this.
16 Figure 2.1 graphically summarizes the above mentioned flow opportunities from the 
beginning of Dutch secondary education, that is, starting at age 12.  
 
13 It does not matter whether this is a mavo-havo, mavo-havo-vwo or another combined class that includes both mavo and 
havo. As long as the choice for both the low track and the high track is open it is considered to be a comprehensive class. 
14 At the end of primary school pupils get an advice which secondary school type they can best enroll in. This advice is not 
binding, but it is a strong recommendation taken seriously by the secondary schools. It can be interpreted as a proxy for 
perceived ability.  
15 In the period 1997-2004 comprehensive schools received extra funding from the government in order to stimulate scale 
increase. We have to be aware that differences in the amount of available resources (which is essentially not related to early 
tracking) might play a role in a comparison between pupils in categorial mavo and a mavo-havo-(vwo) class. However, this 
potential difference is not likely to have a large impact on our analyses. First of all, the extra funding has not affected the first 
two cohorts of 1989 and 1993. Secondly, available economic literature shows that additional resources do not guarantee 
better educational performance (see for example Leuven et al. (2007)). 
16 Hence we choose to use one advice group and, given this advice group, to take into account specific class types. Pupils 
that share the same advice after primary school can be considered to be homogeneous with respect to perceived ability. 
Taking into account more advice groups simultaneously in the analysis increases the risk of omitted variable bias as pupils 
with different advices are more likely to differ in unobserved characteristics. Therefore, we choose to focus our analysis on 
one advice group. The mavo advice group seems to be the most interesting group which potentially benefits most in terms of 
an increase in participation in higher education by implementing a comprehensive system. 
Given the homogeneous advice group we selected, we can choose which class types to include in the ‘low track’ and 
the ‘comprehensive system’. Again to decrease the risk of endogeneity problems we choose to include class types which 
are very much in accordance with the advice, as unobserved characteristics may be behind the choice of a pupil to enter a 
certain education level that is not in line with his ability. 
Therefore, we consider the mavo advice group that is either tracked in a categorial mavo or enters a comprehensive 
mavo-havo or mavo-havo-vwo class. This already captures a very large part (around 85-90%) of the mavo-advice sample.  
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Figure 2.1  Flow chart of Dutch education system: routes towards higher education for tracked versus non-
tracked pupils in first year of secondary education.   
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2.2  Identification 
To analyze the effect of early tracking we estimate the following equation: 
Yi = α Xi + β Ti + εi ,                                                                                                                    (2.1) 
where Yi is the outcome variable of interest,  Xi  denotes a vector of background characteristics, 
Ti is a dummy variable which indicates whether a pupil is early tracked or not and εi is the error 
term. Ti  takes value 1 if a pupil enters secondary education in a categorial mavo and takes value 
0 if it enters a combined class. The parameter of interest is  β. 
In our analysis we consider two educational outcomes. First, the essential outcome of interest is 
participation in higher education. Second, we investigate the effect on completion of higher 
education. For these analyses we use dummy variables indicating whether a pupil has once 
entered or completed higher education.    20 
Estimation of equation (2.1) by OLS may provide biased and inconsistent estimates if the error 
term is correlated with tracking. Hence, in case of unobserved heterogeneity we can no longer 
interpret β as the causal effect of early tracking. We address this problem in several ways. First, 
by restricting our estimation sample to the group of pupils that leave primary education with a 
mavo-advice, we select a homogeneous group of pupils with respect to ability which reduces 
potential endogeneity problems. Second, we include a large set of individual control variables 
like personal and socioeconomic background characteristics, which decreases the likelihood of 
an omitted variable bias. In addition, we are able to control for differences in ability by 
including test scores of the pupils. 
Nevertheless, it is conceivable that unobservables exist that are correlated both with early 
tracking and the outcome variable. Motivated parents, for example, may rather have their child 
start secondary education in a combined class which gives better perspective to flow into a 
more advanced type of secondary education (havo or vwo) later on.  
To solve for this potential endogeneity problem, we use an instrumental variables (IV) 
technique. The instrument we use is the relative supply of categorial schools in particular 
municipality types. The underlying idea is to exploit exogenous variation in tracking caused by 
regional differences in the supply of combined and tracked classes.
17  
 
The municipalities of residence of the pupils are classified in 12 categories based on a number 
of characteristics including the total number of residents and the percentage of the population 
active in agriculture. For each of these 12 categories the total number of ‘tracked’ and ‘non-
tracked’ schools is known. From this we calculate a supply-ratio of tracked schools which is 
defined as the total number of categorial secondary schools divided by the total number of 
schools in that type of municipality. We use the supply-ratio as an instrument for early tracking 
and estimate equation (2.1) by two-stage least squares (2sls). The first stage, in which early 
tracking is regressed on the supply-ratio and all covariates, is  
Ti = γ Xi + δ Si + ui ,                                                                                                                   (2.2) 
where Si denotes the relative supply-ratio of categorial schools in the municipality of residence 
type of pupil i and ui is the error term.  
 
 
17 Ideally, we would have had individual data on the supply of both categorial and combined classes in a pupil’s 
neighborhood and used some distance measure (for example the distance between the nearest categorial and the nearest 
combined class) as an instrument. As these data are not available, we use more aggregated data on the supply of categorial 
and combined classes in different municipality types.    21 
The supply-ratio is a legitimate instrument if it is correlated with early tracking and not with 
enrollment in (or completion of) higher education. Hence, the effect of early tracking is 
identified on the assumption that the supply-ratio does only affect the outcome variable of 
interest through early tracking. To further reduce the risk of an endogeneity bias we include an 
urbanization indicator in the analysis to control for possible effects of the municipality of 
residence on the outcome variable. This urbanization indicator is an additional measure for 
municipality of residence type.
18   
 
 
18 In contrast to the classification in 12 categories, this indicator is only based on the number of residents.   22   23 
3  Data description 
In our empirical analysis, we use data from the Secondary Education Pupil Cohorts (VOCL) 
1989, 1993 and 1999.
19 These are longitudinal data collected by Statistics Netherlands and 
GION.
20 Each cohort consists of a representative sample of around 20,000 pupils that enroll in 
the first grade of secondary education in a particular year.
21 These pupils are followed during 
their school careers until they leave the education system. Hence, for each pupil in each 
calendar year its corresponding school type and grade is known.  
 
Approximately halfway the first year of secondary education, the pupils do tests in arithmetic, 
language and information processing. These so-called ‘entrance tests’ are comparable to the 
CITO test and results serve as an indicator for ability of the pupils.
22 Furthermore, the parents of 
the pupils were asked to fill in questionnaires which include questions on ethnicity, education 
and profession level of the parents, and family composition. This provides a large set of 
personal and socio-economic background characteristics. 
 
The public files of the Secondary Education Pupil Cohorts follow the pupils until the school 
year 2003-2004. As the measurement of the final educational attainment is the key to our 
analysis, it is important to dispose of more recent years too. This makes it most plausible that 
for all pupils final educational attainment is observed. For this purpose, we received access to 
the private files of Statistics Netherlands with the most recent available data until the school 
year 2007-2008.  
Moreover, we extended our data on participation in higher education with one additional 
school year (2007-2008) by matching it with the CRIHO data, which are register data on 
enrollment in higher education.
23 This provided us with the most up-to-date information on 
enrollment. 
A comparison of our sample with the population shows that the shares of pupils that enter 
(around 40%) and complete (around 30%) higher education in the cohorts 1989 and 1993 are 




19 Because of the change in education system, we discuss both the data and analyses of the 1999 cohort (after the 
introduction of vmbo) separately in section 5. 
20 GION is an institute for research on education that is part of the University of Groningen. 
21 For more details on representativeness of the sample we refer to Statistics Netherlands (1991) and Driessen and Van der 
Werf (1992). 
22 The CITO test is a nationwide test pupils do at the end of primary school which is used for the assignment of pupils into 
secondary schools. See section 6.1 for a discussion on potential problems in using these entrance tests as proxy for ability 
and their implications for the estimation results. 
23 In Dutch CRIHO is an abbreviation of ‘Centraal Register Inschrijvingen Hoger Onderwijs’. We also used this data from 
CRIHO to check our VOCL data on enrollment in higher education. Both data sets turned out to coincide very well. 
24 In the Dutch Labor Force Survey 23.6% of the students aged 24 completed higher education in 2001. Furthermore, the 
share of pupils aged 25-34 with a tertiary education degree is 34% in 2004, while the share of the population aged 25-65 
with a tertiary degree is 29% (CPB, 2007).   24 
In 1989, the sample of pupils that leave primary education with a mavo-advice consists of 4912 
pupils, of which 3123 (63.6 %) enter secondary education in a categorial mavo class and 1190 
(24.2 %) in combined mavo-havo or mavo-havo-vwo class.
25  
The descriptive statistics of the variables we use in our analysis are shown in table 3.1. This 
table reports the descriptives for the estimation sample consisting of the pupils for which all 
covariates are available. The first column reports the sample means for the group of pupils that 
enter secondary education in a tracked class, while the second column reports them for the 
group of pupils that enter secondary education in a comprehensive class. The last column 
reports the p-value of the difference, calculated using a two-tailed t-test or a chi-squared test.   
Scores on each of the tests are between 0 (minimum score) and 20 (maximum score). The 
highest education level of parents, highest profession level of parents, ethnicity, household 
composition and urbanization of the city of residence, are all categorical variables.  
 
There appears to be no significant difference in test scores between the tracked and the non-
tracked pupils. Hence, both groups of pupils seem to be comparable with respect to ability.  
Furthermore, no significant differences in gender and age are observed. The parents of tracked 
pupils have a significant lower level of education and a lower profession level. Furthermore, 





25 Since we do not observe all classes a school offers, we cannot make an explicit distinction between a categorial mavo 
school that only offers mavo classes and a comprehensive school that also offers a categorial mavo track. 
26 An additional analysis in which we regress tracking on all covariates simultaneously, yields no significant effects. This 
suggests that the covariates are very much correlated.     25 
 
 
Table 3.1   Descriptive statistics for mavo advice estimation sample, cohort 1989, early tracked (mavo) 
versus later tracked (mavo-havo)-vwo)
a 




P-value of difference 
       
Ability       
Test score arithmetic
b 
10.6  10.6  0.864 
Test score language
b 
11.7  11.7  0.620 
Test score information processing
b 
11.7  11.7  0.983 
       
Personal and SES variables       
Female    56    55  0.574 
       
Age  12.6  12.6  0.410 
       
Highest education level parents 
No primary education 
Primary education 
Secondary education low 
Secondary education high 
Higher education first phase 
Higher education second phase 

























       
Profession level parents 
Worker 
Self-employed without personnel 




















































       
Family Composition 
None of parents 
Only mother 
Mother and others 
Only father 
Father and others 
Father and mother 
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Table 3.2   Descriptive statistics for mavo advice estimation sample, cohort 1989, early tracked (mavo) 
versus later tracked (mavo-havo)-vwo)
a (continued) 




P-value of difference 
       
























       
Education outcomes       
Ever participated in higher education  33.4  38.3  0.005 
       
Completed higher education  21.3  26.8  0.001 
       
Time to enrolment in higher education in years  7.94  7.68  0.030 
       
Number of pupils  2905  1031   
 
a
 All numbers represent percentages, unless stated otherwise.  
b
 Test scores are of entrance tests taken in first year of secondary education. The maximum score for each test is 20.  
 
Both enrollment and completion of higher education are significantly lower for tracked pupils. 
This lower participation in higher education among the tracked pupils can be (partly) traced 
back to differences in flow opportunities after the first year of secondary education. Pupils that 
entered secondary education in a comprehensive class still have an opportunity to move on to a 
higher track (i.e. havo or vwo) in subsequent years, which provides direct access to higher 
education. Table 3.2 gives an overview of the education careers in secondary education of both 
tracked and non-tracked pupils.
27 We indeed observe that the non-tracked pupils are more likely 
to move on directly to the higher tracks. In the second cohort year, for example, participation in 
havo or vwo is 14 percentage points higher for the non-tracked students. In the third and fourth 
cohort years, this difference increases to 18 percentage points. Later on, these differences in 
education careers translate into differences in higher education enrollment in favor of non-
tracked students.  
 
27 Similar overviews of the education careers in the other cohorts can be found in appendix A.   27 
Table 3.2  Routes through education in first nine years after entering secondary education, tracked (=mavo) 
versus non-tracked (=mavo/havo or mavo/havo/vwo); mavo-advice estimation sample, cohort 1989 
  < Mavo  Mavo  Comprehen-
sive: (l)mh 
or (l)mhv 




                   
Year 1                   
Non-tracked   0  0  100  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Tracked  0  100  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
                   
Year 2                   
Non-tracked   8  42  32  7  9  0  0  0  1 
Tracked  3  94  0  1  1  0  0  0  0 
                   
Year 3                   
Non-tracked   11  58  9  12  5  3  0  0  2 
Tracked  7  90  0  2  0  0  0  0  1 
                   
Year 4                   
Non-tracked   14  61  1  16  1  3  0  0  4 
Tracked  9  87  0  2  0  0  0  0  2 
                   
Year 5                   
Non-tracked   9  24  0  23  0  3  31  0  10 
Tracked  6  21  0  12  0  0  52  0  9 
                   
Year 6                   
Non-tracked   2  3  0  16  0  4  49  3  22 
Tracked  2  2  0  11  0  1  64  0  20 
                   
Year 7                   
Non-tracked   0  0  0  6  0  3  50  9  31 
Tracked  0  0  0  3  0  1  62  5  29 
                   
Year 8                   
Non-tracked   0  0  0  1  0  0  32  20  47 
Tracked  0  0  0  0  0  0  37  16  47 
                   
Year 9                   
Non-tracked   0  0  0  0  0  0  16  27  57 
Tracked  0  0  0  0  0  0  16  22  62 
                    a
 The percentages shown in this column seem to overstate real shares of people that left education. This is because the cohort may have lost 
track of some students that moved to other schools (in other cities) or that have temporarily left education and returned after some time. This 
also explains why the reported percentages active in higher education are somewhat lower than the ones we found after having matched the 
students from the VOCL cohorts with a central register of all higher education participants over time.  
 
In addition, early tracked pupils need more time to enter higher education. This finding is 
intuitive as a comprehensive class provides an institutionally shorter way to higher education. 
Table 3.3 indeed shows that early tracked pupils more often take the longer route via mbo 




28 Appendix A shows similar patterns of education careers for the other cohorts.    28 
 
The descriptive statistics for the estimation sample of the cohorts 1993 can be found in table 
B.1 of appendix B. 
In 1993, the sample of pupils that leave primary education with a mavo-advice consists of 
4367 pupils, of which 2214 (50.1 %) enter secondary education in a categorial mavo class and 
1373 (31.4 %) in a combined mavo-havo or mavo-havo-vwo class. The covariates are similar to 
those in the 1989 cohort, except for the variables ‘family composition’ and ‘ethnicity’ which are 
not available. As a proxy for ethnicity we use the variable ‘father’s country of birth’ instead.
29 
In contrast to the 1989 cohort, the results suggest a difference in ability between the tracked 
and non-tracked pupils. In 1993 pupils in categorial mavo do significantly worse on all test 
scores. In addition, significant differences are observed for ethnicity and urbanization. 
Differences with respect to the education and profession level of the parents are not (clearly) 
observed now. The early tracked enroll significantly less in higher education and a lower 
fraction of the pupils completes higher education.  
 
 
29 In the 1989 cohort ‘ethnicity’ was based  both the parents’ and the pupil’s country of birth. 
Table 3.3          Routes towards higher education: percentages of last completed education level before entering 
higher education (cohort 1989) 
Education level  Early tracked: mavo  Non-tracked: mavo-havo(-vwo) 
     
Mbo  61  42 
Havo  26  36 
Vwo  4  12 
Other  9  10   29 
4  Results 
In this section, we first present the estimation results of the first-stage regressions and discuss 
the impact of the relative supply-ratio of categorial schools on school type choice. In particular, 
we investigate whether the estimations give rise to concern for weak instruments. After that we 
present our main results on the effects of early tracking for all cohorts, which include both OLS 
and IV estimations. 
4.1  The effect of regional supply on school type choice 
The regional supply of school types may cause exogenous variation in actual school type 
choice. Table 4.1 presents the supply-ratios of categorial schools for each of the municipality 
types. The first column reports the twelve different municipality types. The second and third 
column report the supply-ratios for each of these municipality types for the cohorts 1989 and 
1993, respectively.
30 There are no supply-ratios reported for the municipality types ‘countryside 
A1’ and ‘countryside A2’, as we observe no schools in our estimation sample for these regions. 
 
In 1989, the relative supply-ratios are substantially smaller in the larger cities and specific 
commuter municipalities, compared to the countryside, rural and small cities. This implies that 
pupils living in these last types of municipalities are more restricted in their choice for 
combined classes. In 1993, the supply-ratios are lower for most municipality types compared to 
those in 1989. The average nationwide supply-ratio of categorial schools has decreased from 
0.75 to 0.57 between 1989 and 1993.  
 
As discussed before, we use the supply-ratio as an instrument for early tracking and estimate 
equation (2.1) by two-stage least squares. Table 4.2 presents the estimation results of regression 
(2.2) for different cohort samples. The robust standard error, corrected for clustering at the 
school level, is shown below each estimate in parentheses. The number of observations is 
denoted by N.  
A well-known concern in using the IV-approach is the problem of weak instruments.
31 
Staiger and Stock (1997) proposed to use a cut-off value of 10 for the F-value of the excluded 
instrument. If the F-value in the first-stage is above this cut-off value, correlation of the 
instrument with the endogenous variable is considered to be sufficiently strong.  
 
30 The supply-ratio is defined as the number of categorial schools divided by the total number of schools in each municipality 
type. See appendix C for an overview of the number of categorial and combined schools in our estimation sample for each 
of the municipality types in all cohorts. 
31 Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995) address the finite sample problem of weak instruments, in which case IV estimates are 
biased towards OLS even in fairly large samples.    30 
Table 4.1           Supply-ratios of categorial schools 
Municipality type  1989  1993 
     
Countryside A1     
Countryside A2     
Countryside A3  0.80  0.75 
Countryside A4  1.00                     0.57 
Urbanized countryside B1  0.92  0.90 
Urbanized countryside B2  0.85  0.77 
Specific commuter municipality B3  0.59  0.60 
Rural cities C1  0.88  0.78 
Small cities C2  0.85  0.44 
Medium-sized cities C3  0.56  0.58 
Medium-sized cities C4  0.52  0.37 
Big cities C5  0.74  0.41 
 
Table 4.2           The impact of the relative supply-ratio on early tracking 
  1989  1993  Pooled sample 
1989-1993 
       
Relative supply ratio    0.878
*** 
(0.255) 





       
Socio-economic status variables (SES)  yes  yes  yes 
Test scores  yes  yes  yes 
N  3936  2954  6577 
 
* Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
In 1989, we find an F-value of 11.9. However, the F-value of the effect of the supply-ratio on 
early tracking equals 1.58 in 1993, which raises concerns for weak instruments. Apparently, the 
differences in relative supply of categorial classes between different types of municipalities do 
not explain much variation in early tracking in 1993. A possible explanation for this may be the 
overall decrease in relative supply of categorial schools over time.
32 Whereas pupils in 1989 
had limited choice of entering a combined class in particular regions, pupils in 1993 faced less 
restrictions in choosing class type. The weak statistical relationship between supply-ratio and 
school choice indicates that we may have weak instruments for the cohort 1993, and hence we 
will not pursue with this approach for this cohort.  
In a pooled sample of the 1989 and 1993 cohort, the F-value equals 15.3. In order to obtain a 
pooled sample in which identical control variables are available for all individuals, we had to 
make two adjustments to the 1989 cohort. First, we left family composition out of the set of 
covariates as this variable is not available for the 1993 cohort. Second, in the 1993 cohort we 
 
32 In the early nineties, there was a tendency to scale increase in Dutch schools which resulted in larger schools offering 
various education levels and presumably more first-grade combined classes.   31 
only observe the country of birth of the father. Hence, we have substituted the variable 
‘ethnicity’ for the variable ‘country of birth of the father’, which is also available in the 1989  
cohort.
33 Apparently, pooling the data of the cohorts 1989 and 1993 decreases standard errors 
sufficiently to obtain a fairly good first-stage. 
4.2  The effects of early tracking 
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 present the main estimation results. Table 4.3 reports the estimation results 
of various regression analyses on participation in higher education for different cohort samples. 
The first model regresses a dummy variable for participation in higher education on only a 
constant and early tracking. In the second model personal and socio-economic control variables 
like age, gender, ethnicity, education and profession level of parents and family composition (if 
available) are included, while the third model additionally includes test scores.
34 The fourth 
model specification is identical to the third model and is estimated by 2sls, using  
the supply-ratio of categorial classes as an instrument for early tracking. 
The first and second rows present the results for the cohorts 1989 and 1993, respectively.  
The third row shows the estimation results for the pooled sample of the cohorts 1989 and 1993.  
Table 4.4 is similarly structured and presents the estimation results of the regression 
analyses on completion of higher education.  
In the presentation of the results, we only show the estimated coefficients for early tracking.
35 
As discussed above, we do not present the IV results for the 1993 cohort, as we have serious 
concern for weak instruments. 
 
 
33 As there are more missings on this variable in 1989 compared to ethnicity, the total number of observations in the pooled 
cohort is smaller than the sum of observations of the two separate cohorts.  
34 In addition to test scores which proxy unobserved ability, we dispose of a variable that proxies unobserved motivation. 
This is a measure for motivation on a scale from 1 to 5, based on a questionnaire pupils fill in after a couple of months in the 
first grade of secondary education. Nevertheless, we have chosen not to include this variable in our main specifications as 
we have serious concern that this variable depends on school choice. As the questionnaires were not administered before 
the start of the school year, the variable can be very well affected by the particular school and class, as well as the choice of 
tracking. Inclusion of this variable in the set of covariates turns out to hardly change the estimated effect of tracking. 
 
35 The estimated coefficients for other covariates are available upon request.   32 
Table 4.3  The impact of early tracking on participation in higher education 








         














         













         
















         
SES  no  yes  yes  yes 
Test Score  no  no  yes  yes 
 





Table 4.4  The impact of early tracking on completion of higher education 








         
















         













         
















         
SES  no  yes  yes  yes 
Test Score  no  no  yes  yes 
 
* Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
   33 
The OLS analyses all yield a negative effect of early tracking on participation in higher 
education. The estimated coefficients decrease (in absolute value) when additional control 
variables are included in the model. The IV estimations also yield negative, but larger (absolute) 
point estimates. Except for the full model OLS and IV estimations in 1989, all estimated 
coefficients are statistically significant.  
The estimated coefficients of the cohorts 1989 and 1993 are reasonably in line which each 
other. To contribute to the precision of out estimations we also perform analyses on the pooled 
sample of the 1989 and the 1993 cohort pupils. As discussed before, we had to make some 
adjustments to the 1989 cohort to obtain identical control variables for all pupils. In addition, 
we included a dummy variable for being in the 1993 cohort in all models.
36 The results are 
similar to the basic estimations, but have smaller standard errors.  The analyses on the pooled 
model all yield significant negative effects of early tracking. 
 
The interpretation of the IV estimates differs from that of the OLS estimates. Whereas the OLS 
estimations give the average treatment effect (ATE), the estimated IV coefficients should be 
interpreted as the ATE for the subpopulation of pupils whose choice for being early tracked or 
not is affected by the instrument.
37 In our case, this is the subpopulation that is more likely to 
choose the comprehensive class if the supply of comprehensive classes increases. Hence, the IV 
effect is only applicable to the pupils whose choice of class type is affected if the supply of 
comprehensive classes in their region changes. Although the interpretations differ, both OLS 
and IV estimates clearly point to the same direction. Hence, we consider the OLS estimates to 
be supported by the IV estimates. 
 
The analyses on completion of higher education also yield negative and significant effects of 
early tracking. The estimated effects on enrollment and on completion of higher education are 
almost identical.
38 The IV estimations on completion of higher education again yield larger 
(absolute) effects of early tracking. 
 
To summarize, all presented estimation results yield a negative sign for early tracking and 
(besides the OLS and IV estimates on participation for the 1989 cohort) are statistically 
significant. We find that early tracking decreases the probability of both enrollment and 
completion of higher education by around 4%-points. The OLS estimates in the 1989 cohort 
and the pooled cohort are supported by the IV estimates. These results provide evidence of a 
detrimental effect of early tracking on higher educational outcomes. 
 
36 This estimated coefficient of this dummy variable is close to zero and insignificant. 
37 This is the local average treatment effect (LATE) which does not automatically apply to a random chosen pupil (Imbens 
and Angrist, 1994). Stated differently, it is the effect of the treatment on the subpopulation of compliers, who have changed 
their behavior as a result of the instrument. The local average treatment effect (LATE) can differ substantially from the 
average treatment effect (ATE) if the fraction of the population that is affected is small (Oreopoulous, 2006). 
38 Hence, early tracking decreases both enrollment in and completion of higher education by around 4 percentage points. 
This implies that, measured in percentages, early tracking has a larger negative impact on completion of higher education.    34 
   35 
5  Effects after the introduction of vmbo 
In 1999, ‘lbo’ and ‘mavo’ were combined into one track called ‘vmbo’. Vmbo (preparatory 
middle-level vocational education) lasts four years and combines vocational with theoretical 
education. Vmbo itself consists of four levels, in each of which a different mix of practical 
vocational education training and theoretical education is combined. The track vmbo-tl 
(‘theoretical learning path’) is the most theoretical of the four and best comparable to the former 
mavo. This is the only level which provides direct access to havo.  
The change in the education system has led us to treat the 1999 cohort separately from the 
other ones. The introduction of vmbo has caused quite some public debate, which may have 
contributed to a negative image of vmbo schools. As a consequence, we expect that selectivity 
has increased in the 1999 cohort. This section presents regression analyses for the 1999 cohort 
to provide some insight in the effect of early tracking in the current education system in the 
Netherlands.  
 
The estimation sample for the cohort 1999 differs in some respects from the other two cohorts. 
In order to stay as close as possible to the analyses in the other cohorts, we selected pupils who 
leave primary education with a mavo or a vmbo-tl advice.
39 This group consists of 2452 pupils 
of which 1148 (46.8%) enter secondary education in vmbo (the ‘tracked’) and 1268 (51.7%) 
enter in a combined vmbo-havo or vmbo-havo-vwo class (the ‘non-tracked’). 
In 1999, there is no variable for the profession level of the parents available. With respect to 
education level of the parents, we now dispose of two variables, one for the mother and one for 
the father. The descriptive statistics for the estimation samples of the cohort 1999 can be found 
in table B.2 of appendix B. There is a significant difference between the tracked and non-
tracked pupils with respect to ability: the non-tracked pupils perform better on all test scores. 
Furthermore, there appears to be a significant difference in age, highest education level of both 
father and mother, ethnicity and urbanization degree. 
As we observe the pupils up to the school year 2007-2008, we measure enrollment in higher 
education after nine years of education. At that time, enrollment is significantly higher for the 
non-tracked pupils. As none of the pupils has completed higher education after nine years, the 
time span over which we observe the pupils is too short to obtain information on this variable.  
 
Table 5.1 reports the OLS estimation results of several regression analyses on participation in 
higher education.
40 The first model regresses a dummy variable for participation in higher 
education on only a constant and early tracking. In the second model, the available personal and 
 
39 As vmbo was to start in August 1999, some schools still used the ‘old’ mavo advices while others used the ‘new’ vmbo-tl 
advices at the time pupils left primary education. 
40 We do not carry out IV analyses for the 1999 cohort as, similarly to the 1993 cohort, there is serious concern for weak 
instruments. The average nationwide supply-ratio of categorial schools is 0.54 and the F-value of the effect of the supply-
ratio on tracking in the first-stage regression is 4.61 in 1999.   36 
socio-economic control variables are included, while the third model additionally includes test 
scores. 
Table 5.1  The impact of early tracking on participation in higher education (cohort 1999) 






       






  − 0.092
*** 
(0.029) 
       
SES  no  no  yes 
Test score  no  yes  yes 
N  2153  2153  2153 
 
* Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
The OLS analyses yield significant negative effects of early tracking on participation in higher 
education, which is in line with our previous findings. The estimated coefficient of early 
tracking is larger in absolute value compared to the 1989 and 1993 cohorts. It is, however, 
important to stress that the we cannot directly interpret this difference in magnitude of the effect 
as the results of the 1999 cohort are not easily comparable to those in the other cohorts. After 
all, we can think of many potential confounders originating from the change in the education 
system that may have affected the estimated coefficient.  
First of all, the impact of the mechanisms underlying the effect of early tracking may have 
changed by the introduction of vmbo, for example because of differences in first-grade class 
composition. Our available data do not distinguish between vmbo-tl and other vmbo pupils and 
hence we do not observe the composition of first-grade classes in vmbo. However, it is well 
conceivable that there is more variation in ability compared to a categorial mavo, which may 
imply different peer effects or different opportunities for teachers to focus course material to all 
pupils. Besides, effects from teacher sorting may have changed if teacher preferences for 
teaching a vmbo class differ from teaching a categorial mavo class.  
Secondly, it may be that the change in the education system has caused different 
opportunities to flow through various education levels. After the introduction of vmbo it may 
have become more difficult to switch to havo, either because of institutional reasons or because 
the education content at vmbo fits worse to havo compared to the education content at the 
former mavo.  
Thirdly, there may have been some behavioral effects after the change of the education 
system. It might be that advices at primary school are somewhat adjusted, more directed at a 
clear recommendation for either a vmbo school or not. Moreover, pupils and their parents’ 
motives for choosing a tracked or comprehensive class may have changed, because of a 
different image of vmbo compared to the former mavo. 
   37 
Apart from the difficulties in comparing the results in the 1999 cohort to those in the other 
cohorts, we have to be careful with the estimation results themselves as the 1999 cohort is less 
suitable for studying the effects of early tracking in general. It is well conceivable that the 
introduction of vmbo has increased self-selection into either a vmbo track or a comprehensive 
class. The descriptive statistics indeed show that tracked and non-tracked pupils differ 
significantly on all covariates, including the cognitive test scores. There seems to be an increase 
over time in observable differences between tracked and non-tracked pupils which may also 
indicate an increase in unobservable differences. Because of this apparently larger self-selection 
problem, and the lack of a strong instrument that is needed to use an instrumental variables 
method to address this problem, the estimated effect may be biased. 
In addition, as we only observe enrollment after nine years, this leaves us with less reliable 
estimates compared to the other cohorts, in which we observe the pupils over a longer time 
span. 
 
Therefore, although this analysis may be most interesting from a policy perspective as it  
focuses on the most actual situation in Dutch education, it provides less reliable information 
about the effect the of postponement of track assignment in general. Consequently, the 
estimation results, which suggest a negative effect of early tracking for the vmbo-tl pupils, 
should be treated with some reservation. 
   38   39 
6  Robustness checks 
This section discusses some additional analyses to examine the robustness of the main results of 
this paper. We concentrate on two issues. 
First, we address the role of the entrance test as proxy for ability including its potential 
drawbacks and implications for the estimated effects.  
Second, we investigate the sensitivity of the results to the definitions of a low track and a 
comprehensive class we used in our analysis. In order to do this, we present additional 
regression analyses in which we vary the class types included in the low track and 
comprehensive classes.  
6.1  The role of entrance tests as proxy for ability 
In our main estimations, we use entrance test scores on arithmetic, language and information 
processing as proxy for unobserved ability. These tests are short versions of the CITO test 
pupils make around halfway the first year of secondary education.  
A first criticism on this measure may be that it is not a high-stake test like the real CITO test 
which is explicitly used to assign pupils to different levels of secondary education. A second 
criticism may be that the tests are not made before the start of secondary education, which 
would rule out that test scores already pick up some of the learning effect in secondary 
education. Because entrance tests are made around halfway the first year, we might conjecture 
that our estimated coefficients of early tracking would be a lower bound (in absolute value) of 
the true effect. 
 
CITO test scores of all pupils at the end of primary education would not suffer from these 
drawbacks, and hence would be a better measure for ability.   
Unlike the other cohorts, the cohort 1999 provides us with information on individual CITO 
test scores for around two third of the sample. Within our estimation sample of the 1999 cohort, 
the CITO test scores are available for 1382 pupils. We can use this information to obtain some 
insight in the implications of using entrance test scores instead of CITO scores for the estimated 
effects. Table 6.1 presents the average total score on entrance tests (which is the sum of the test 
scores on arithmetic, language and information processing) and the average CITO test scores 
for this sample.  
Table 6.1  Entrance and CITO test scores (cohort 1999) 
  Vmbo  Vmbo-havo(-vwo)  p-value of difference 
       
Total score entrance tests  33.5  34.9  0.00 
CITO test score               532.9               533.3  0.21 
N                  741                  641     40 
Both the test scores indicate that pupils in combined vmbo-havo(-vwo) classes have on average 
a higher ability. However, in contrast to the entrance tests, the difference in CITO test scores is 
not statistically significant. Hence, the difference in entrance tests might (partly) be the result of 
tracking.  
 
Table 6.2 presents the estimation results of two models. In the first model, enrollment in higher 
education is regressed on tracking, entrance test scores as proxy for ability, and all other 
personal and socio-economic covariates. The second model is identically specified, except for 
the fact that entrance tests are now replaced by the CITO test score.  
Table 6.2  The impact of early tracking on participation in higher education (cohort 1999) 




     






     
SES  yes  yes 
Entrance Test Score  yes  no 
CITO test score  no  yes 
N  1382  1382 
 
* Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
The estimated effect with entrance test scores included is lower (in absolute value) compared to 
the effect with CITO test scores included.
41  
 Moreover, the estimation results in tables 4.3 and 4.4 already show that leaving out the 
entrance test scores in the model specification yields an even larger (absolute) effect of 
tracking.  
These findings indicate that, if anything, our estimates provide a lower bound of the 
(absolute) actual effect, which confirms our conjecture. Hence, it does not seem plausible that 
potential problems with the entrance test scores would be behind the estimated negative effect 
of early tracking. 
6.2  Various definitions of tracking 
In the previous sections, we focused on pupils with a mavo advice that either entered secondary 
education in a categorial mavo (the low track) or in a combined mavo-havo or mavo-havo-vwo 
class (the comprehensive class).
42 Although this captures already a large fraction of the pupils 
 
41 In addition, point estimates for this subsample are now smaller (in absolute value) than in the full estimation sample, which 
can be due to the fact that this subsample of pupils has a lower average ability as can be seen from tables B.2 and 6.1. As 
the probability of enrollment in higher education is lower it may be that the difference in tracking is less important in this 
subsample. 
42 For a justification of the choice of this subsample of classes see section 2.1 including footnote 16.   41 
with a mavo advice, it is worthful to check whether results change if we do include pupils that 
choose to enter other class types.  
Including different types of classes in a certain track may for example change the effect because 
of different peer effects pupils experience.  
 
Tables 6.3 and 6.4 present the OLS estimation results for the cohort 1989 of four models that 
are identically specified except for the definition of tracking and non-tracking.
43 Each of the 
models includes all available control variables. The definitions used in each of the models are as 
follows: 
 
Model 1: tracking = mavo and comprehensive = mavo-havo, mavo-havo-vwo (the basic model) 
Model 2: tracking = lbo-mavo, mavo and comprehensive = mavo-havo, mavo-havo-vwo 
Model 3: tracking = lbo, lbo-mavo, mavo and comprehensive = mavo-havo, mavo-havo-vwo 
Model 4: tracking = lbo, lbo-mavo, mavo and comprehensive = lbo-mavo-havo, lbo-mavo-
havo-vwo, mavo-havo, mavo-havo-vwo. 
Table 6.3  The impact of early tracking on participation in higher education (sensitivity analysis) 








         












         
SES  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Test score  yes  yes  yes  yes 
N  3936  4205  4296  4351 
 
* Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Table 6.4  The impact of early tracking on completion of  higher education (sensitivity analysis) 








         












         
SES  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Test score  yes  yes  yes  yes 
N  3936  4205  4293  4351 




43 For space reasons, we only show the sensitivity checks for the 1989 cohort. In the other cohorts, we obtain similar results.   42 
The results show that the estimated effect of early tracking is fairly robust against including 
various class types in the definitions. Including some lower class types to the low track in the 
models (2) and (3) slightly enlarges the impact of tracking (in absolute value). Generally, we 
conclude that varying the class types does not substantially change the results. 
   43 
7  Effects for pupils with higher school advices 
The results presented so far suggest that lower ability pupils can substantially gain from being 
in a comprehensive class. It is important to note that this is the result of a partial analysis, which 
focuses on a single advice group and compares only assignment in a low track to assignment in 
a comprehensive class. These results are not sufficient to judge the efficiency of an early 
tracking regime as a whole. After all, higher ability pupils may be negatively affected by the 
lower ability ones in a comprehensive class. 
This section investigates the effects of tracking for other advice groups in which we also 
compare allocation in a high track to allocation in a comprehensive class. Focusing on the 
effects of tracking for pupils with different abilities contributes to obtaining a more general 
view on the efficiency effects of early tracking.
44  
 
Firstly, we concentrate on the pupils who leave primary education with a havo advice. We use 
this group to analyze the effect of being in a high track compared to being in a comprehensive 
class. The non-tracked pupils are as usual defined as those who enter secondary education in a 
mavo-havo or mavo-havo-vwo class. The tracked pupils are defined as those who enter 
secondary education in a havo or havo-vwo class.
45 This is the mirror image of the previous 
analysis on the group of mavo-advice pupils, which compared assignment in a low track to 
assignment in a comprehensive class.
46 Table 7.1 presents the full model OLS estimations of 
early tracking on both participation in and completion of higher education for the 1989, 1993 
and pooled cohorts. In 1989, the estimation sample consists of 1162 pupils that enter secondary 
education in a havo-vwo class and 608 pupils that enter in a mavo-havo or mavo-havo-vwo 
class. In 1993, the sample consists of 1107 pupils that enter secondary education in a havo or 
havo-vwo class and 521 that enter in a mavo-havo or mavo-havo-vwo class. 
 
 
44 Since we use only within-country data we have to do partial analyses in order to get a view on the total system. In a cross-
country analysis in which a comprehensive system is compared to an early tracking system both countries have, roughly 
speaking, the same distribution of abilities of the pupils which are thus randomly divided over a tracked and a 
comprehensive system. However, including all pupils (which implies all advice groups and all class types) simultaneously in 
our analysis would substantially increase the endogeneity problem. Specific advice groups (for example lbo, vwo) may be 
more likely to be tracked while others are more likely to be subject to a comprehensive system. Hence, there will be self-
selection of specific advice types with particular unobservables into an early tracking system which substantially increases 
the risk of omitted variable bias.  
Apart from this, the analysis would become fuzzy which would make it very complicated to identify separate effects, 
which is one of the advantages of our analysis compared to a macro-analysis. 
45  We include havo-vwo in the high track because there are very few schools which offer categorial havo classes in the 
Netherlands. We observe no pupils in a categorial havo in 1989 and only a few in 1993. 
46 In this analysis we choose to include both the mavo-havo and mavo-havo-vwo classes as comprehensive classes. In this 
way we use exactly the same definition as in the analysis on the mavo advice pupils. Pupils with a mavo advice benefit from 
entering these classes, and this analysis investigates the effects for pupils with a havo advice that enter these classes.    44 
The results indicate that there is no significant effect of early tracking on both participation in 
and completion of higher education. This suggests that pupils with a havo advice do not 
experience negative effects of being in a comprehensive class together with lower ability pupils. 
Table 7.1           The impact of early tracking on participation in and completion of higher education (havo advice 
group) 
  Cohort 1989  Cohort 1993  Pooled sample  
1989-1993 
       






       






       
SES  yes  yes  yes 
Test score  yes  yes  yes 
N  1770  1628  3279 
 
* Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
We cannot use the instrumental variable analysis to address the potential endogeneity issue 
here, because there are no (severe) restrictions in the supply of high track classes. However, it is 
plausible to assume that potential self-selection would positively affect educational outcomes 
for the high track, as pupils with better unobservable characteristics are likely to self-select into 
the high track and may be expected to enroll more often in higher education. Hence, the 
estimated coefficients can reasonably be interpreted as the upper bounds of the effects of early 
tracking. This makes that potential endogeneity is less of a problem here as we find potentially 
upwards biased effects that are already statistically insignificant.  
 
Secondly, we investigate the effects of tracking for the group of pupils with a mavo-havo 
advice, who are in between the havo and mavo pupils.  
This group has never been tracked at an education level that coincides with perceived 
ability: if they are in a low stream they are tracked at a lower level and in the high stream they 
are tracked at a higher level. We can use this group to perform two kinds of partial analyses. 
   In the first analysis, we estimate the effect of being assigned to a low track (categorial mavo) 
compared to a comprehensive class (mavo-havo or mavo-havo-vwo). In the second analysis, we 
investigate the effect of being assigned to a high track (havo, havo-vwo) compared to being in a 
comprehensive class (mavo-havo or mavo-havo-vwo). Table 7.2 presents the OLS estimation 
results of both analyses for all cohort samples. The first two rows present the estimated effects 
of early tracking on participation in and completion of higher education for the first analysis, 
while the latter two rows present the estimated effects for the second analysis. In each of the 
models, all available control variables are included.   45 
Table 7.2           The impact of early tracking on participation in and completion of higher education (mavo-havo 
advice group) 
  Cohort 1989  Cohort 1993  Pooled sample  
1989-1993 
       
Early tracking on participation 













       
Early tracking on completion 












       
Early tracking on participation 










       
Early tracking on completion 










       
SES  yes  yes  yes 
Test score  yes  yes  yes 
 
* Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Entering secondary education in a low track decreases the probability to enroll in (and 
complete) higher education, compared to entering in a comprehensive class. The estimated 
coefficients are statistically significant, except for the impact of tracking on completion in the 
1993 cohort. These negative effects are in line with the effects we found for the mavo-advice 
group, although point estimates are larger in absolute value now. The mavo-havo advice pupils 
experience a more negative impact of being in a low track, which may be explained by the fact 
that they are placed in a track below their perceived ability. 
In addition, it turns out that there is no significant difference whether a pupil enters the high 
track or a comprehensive class. This result is in line with the effect we found for the havo-
advice pupils. 
 
In conclusion, these analyses suggest that both pupils with a havo-advice and pupils with a 
mavo-havo advice experience no significant difference whether they are in a high track or in a 
comprehensive class. The pupils with a mavo-havo advice experience a negative effect of 
entering a low track instead of a comprehensive class.    46   47 
8  Conclusions and discussion 
This paper investigates the effect of early tracking with respect to participation in higher 
education. In our analysis, we use data from the Secondary Education Pupil Cohorts of 1989, 
1993 and 1999 and exploit differences in the timing of tracking between schools in the 
Netherlands. To deal with potential endogeneity problems we restrict our estimation sample to a 
particular school advice group which is homogeneous with respect to ability, use a large set of 
covariates and adopt an instrumental variables approach. 
 
Our main analysis focuses on pupils with a mavo advice, as this group seems most interesting 
considering a potential negative effect of early tracking. If early tracking would have a 
detrimental effect on participation in higher education, the mavo advice pupils who are tracked 
early are likely to be the group which is most negatively affected. 
In the 1989 cohort, we find (mainly statistically significant) negative effects of early 
tracking on both participation and completion of higher education. The OLS estimates are 
supported by the IV estimates. Similar analyses on the 1993 and the pooled 1989-1993 sample 
all yield comparable significant negative effects of early tracking. These findings turn out to be 
robust in various specifications. The OLS estimates show that early tracking decreases the 
probability of both enrollment and completion of higher education by around 4%- points for 
pupils with a mavo advice. In the 1989 and 1993 cohorts, average enrollment and completion of 
higher education for the tracked pupils is around 35 and 22%, respectively. Hence, pupils with a 
mavo advice that are in a categorial mavo can increase their probabilities to enroll and complete 
higher education to around 39 and 26%, respectively, by entering secondary education in a 
combined mavo-havo(-vwo) class. The IV analyses yield even larger effects in absolute value. 
Hence, the pupils with a mavo advice perform better in a comprehensive class than in a low 
track.  
In the 1999 cohort, we also find a negative impact of early tracking on enrollment in higher 
education. However, we have to be careful with these results as the 1999 cohort is less suitable 
for studying the effects of early tracking in general because of the shorter time span over which 
pupils are observed and some indications for increased selectivity.  
 
Although we find that mavo-advice pupils can gain from being in a comprehensive class, these 
results are not sufficient to judge the efficiency of an early tracking regime as a whole. After all, 
higher ability pupils may be negatively affected by the lower ability ones in a comprehensive 
class. To obtain a more complete view on the impact of early tracking, we have analyzed effects 
for pupils with higher advices. Based on OLS estimations we conclude that pupils with a havo 
advice experience no significant difference whether they are in a high track or in a 
comprehensive class. In addition, two partial analyses on the pupils with a mavo-havo advice   48 
suggest that they are better of in a comprehensive class compared to a low track, while there is 
no significant difference for them between entering a high track or a comprehensive class.  
 
Table 8.1 summarizes the estimation results for all advice groups. While pupils with a mavo 
and mavo-havo advice experience a negative effect of being assigned to a low track compared 
to a comprehensive class, pupils with a mavo-havo and havo advice do not experience a 
positive effect of being tracked in a high track compared to a comprehensive class. These 
results suggest an inefficiency of the early tracking regime with respect to participation in and 
completion of higher education. 
Table 8.1           Summary of results: effects of early tracking on participation in and completion of higher 
education  
Advice Group  Effect of low track vs comprehensive  Effect of high track vs comprehensive 
     
Mavo  —   
Mavo-havo  —  0 
Havo    0 
 
A potential additional advantage of a comprehensive class is that it has a favorable effect on 
duration until entrance in higher education. These pupils need on average 0.3 to 0.5 less years to 
enter higher education.
47 This finding is intuitive as a comprehensive class provides an 
institutionally shorter way to higher education. Early tracked pupils more often take the longer 
route via mbo towards higher education, whereas non-tracked students predominantly take the 
shorter route via havo.  
  
Our analysis is not informative on the underlying mechanism that translates early tracking to 
outcomes. Potential mechanisms are peer effects or teacher quality effects. In addition, 
extending school choice may reduce uncertainty with respect to the pupils’ true capabilities 
which lowers the risk of sending them to the wrong school type. While it may be difficult for 
pupils in a low track to change to another education level that provides access to higher 
education, pupils in a comprehensive class are not restricted yet in their potential routes to 
higher education. The role of these effects in early tracking remains an interesting topic for 
further research.  
Moreover, this study only investigates effects on participation in higher education and does not 
address the highest and lowest advice groups and classes as these are less relevant in this 
respect. This also implies that potential effects of early tracking on performance in secondary or 
 
47 This finding is confirmed in some OLS regressions in which we regress the time between the start of secondary education 
and enrollment in higher education on a dummy variable for tracking and different sets of covariates. As there is some 
concern on issues like sample selection a more elaborate analysis is needed to study duration until entrance in more detail.   49 
higher education, which may serve as indicators for excellence, are beyond the scope of this 
research. 
 
Our study supports the OECD conclusion on the Dutch education system that the early tracking 
regime has a negative effect on participation in higher education. Pupils with a mavo advice are 
more likely to enroll in and complete higher education when they start secondary education in a 
comprehensive class. In the light of this conclusion, the decrease in the number of early tracked 
pupils we observe over time in the cohort samples under consideration, has been an 
encouraging development yet. Enrollment in and completion of higher education can be further 
increased by stimulating participation in combined first-grade classes that keep pupils with a 
mavo or havo advice together for an additional one or two years.  
Any more specific policy implications cannot be derived from our results. With respect to vmbo 
schools for example, we might expect that vmbo-tl students gain from being in a combined 
class together with havo pupils. However, we do not know the effect of such a change for the 
lower advice pupils in vmbo. In addition, more information on underlying mechanisms is 
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Appendix A 
This appendix provides an overview of the education careers of both the tracked and non-
tracked pupils in the estimation samples of the cohorts 1993 and 1999.  
Table A.1  Routes through education in first nine years after entering secondary education, tracked (=mavo) 
versus non-tracked (=mavo/havo or mavo/havo/vwo); mavo-advice estimation sample, cohort 1993 
  < Mavo  Mavo  Comprehen-
sive: (l)mh 
or (l)mhv 




                   
Year 1                   
Non-tracked   0  0  100  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Tracked  0  100  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
                   
Year 2                   
Non-tracked   11  39  30  13  6  1  0  0  0 
Tracked  5  92  0  1  1  0  0  0  1 
                   
Year 3                   
Non-tracked   14  59  3  19  1  3  0  0  1 
Tracked  10  87  0  2  0  0  0  0  1 
                   
Year 4                   
Non-tracked   15  61  0  19  0  3  0  0  2 
Tracked  12  84  0  2  0  0  0  0  2 
                   
Year 5                   
Non-tracked   5  13  0  26  0  3  41  0  13 
Tracked  4  12  0  13  0  0  55  0  16 
                   
Year 6                   
Non-tracked   0  0  0  15  0  2  50  6  26 
Tracked  0  0  0  10  0  0  61  1  28 
                   
Year 7                   
Non-tracked   0  0  0  3  0  3  48  15  34 
Tracked  0  0  0  2  0  0  55  6  37 
                   
Year 8                   
Non-tracked   0  0  0  0  0  1  32  24  44 
Tracked  0  0  0  0  0  1  35  17  48 
                   
Year 9                   
Non-tracked   0  0  0  0  0  0  14  32  54 
Tracked  0  0  0  0  0  0  13  25  62 
                    a
 The percentages shown in this column seem to overstate real shares of people that left education. This is because the cohort may have lost 
track of some students that moved to other schools (in other cities) or that have temporarily left education and returned after some time. This 
also explains why the reported percentages active in higher education are somewhat lower than the ones we found after having matched the 
students from the VOCL cohorts with a central register of all higher education participants over time.  
   55 
Table A.2  Routes through education in first eight years after entering secondary education, tracked (=vmbo) 
versus non-tracked (=mavo/havo or mavo/havo/vwo); mavo-advice estimation sample, cohort 1999 
  Vmbo  Comprehen-
sive: (l)mh or 
(l)mhv 




                 
Year 1                 
Non-tracked  0  100  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Tracked  100  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
                 
Year 2                 
Non-tracked   47  37  10  5  1  0  0  5 
Tracked  96  1  2  0  0  0  0  0 
                 
Year 3                 
Non-tracked   73  1  20  2  2  0  0  3 
Tracked  94  0  3  0  0  0  0  3 
                 
Year 4                 
Non-tracked   75  0  18  0  2  0  0  5 
Tracked  92  0  3  0  0  0  0  5 
                 
Year 5                 
Non-tracked   15  0  24  0  1  47  0  13 
Tracked  13  0  9  0  0  57  0  21 
                 
Year 6                 
Non-tracked   2  0  12  0  2  65  9  10 
Tracked  1  0  8  0  0  75  2  14 
                 
Year 7                 
Non-tracked   0  0  3  0  1  61  19  16 
Tracked  0  0  2  0  0  73  6  19 
                 
Year 8                 
Non-tracked   0  0  1  0  0  48  25  26 
Tracked  0  0  1  0  0  56  14  29 
                  a
 The percentages shown in this column seem to overstate real shares of people that left education. This is because the cohort may have lost 
track of some students that moved to other schools (in other cities) or that have temporarily left education and returned after some time. This 
also explains why the reported percentages active in higher education are somewhat lower than the ones we found after having matched the 












Table A.3          Routes towards higher education: percentages of last completed education level before entering 
higher education (cohort 1993) 
Education level  Early tracked: mavo  Non-tracked: mavo-havo(-vwo) 
     
Mbo  62  41 
Havo  25  43 
Vwo  3  7 
Other  10  9 
Table A.4          Routes towards higher education: percentages of last completed education level before entering 
higher education (cohort 1999) 
Education level  Early tracked: vmbo  Non-tracked: vmbo-havo(-vwo) 
     
Mbo  66  45 
Havo  31  50 
Vwo  2  5 
Other  1  0   57 
            Appendix B 
This appendix provides a detailed description of the data for the estimation samples in the 
cohorts 1993 and 1999. Tables B.1 and B.2 present the descriptive statistics for the cohorts 
1993 and 1999, respectively.   58 
Table B.1  Descriptive statistics for estimation sample, mavo-advice group, cohort 1993, early tracked 
(mavo) versus later tracked (mavo-havo-(vwo))
a 
Variables  Early tracked: mavo  Non-tracked: mavo-
havo(-vwo) 
P-value of difference 
1. Ability       
Test score arithmetic
b 
11.3  11.7  0.001 
Test score language
b 
12.0  12.3  0.009 
Test score information processing
b 
12.2  12.4  0.024 
       
2. Personal and SES variables       
Female    56    54  0.175 
Age (years)  12.56  12.56  0.920 
       
Highest education level parents 
No primary education 
Primary education 
Secondary education low 
Secondary education high 
Higher education first phase 
Higher education second phase 

























       
Profession level parents 
Worker 
Self-employed without personnel 





























       
Father’s country of birth 
The Netherlands 
Marocco 





















       
























       
3. Education outcomes       
Ever participated in higher education  37.3  44.0  0.000 
       
Completed higher education  23.3  28.3  0.003 
       
Time to enrollment in higher education in 
years 
7.72  7.29  0.000 
       
Number of pupils  1864  1090   
        a
 All numbers represent percentages, unless stated otherwise.  
b
 Test scores are of entrance tests taken in the first year of secondary education. The maximum score for each test is 20.    59 
Table B.2  Descriptive Statistics for estimation sample, mavo-advice group, cohort 1999, early tracked 
(vmbo) versus later tracked (vmbo-havo(-vwo))
a 





P-value of difference 
1. Ability measures       
       
Test score arithmetic
c 
11.0  11.7  0.000 
Test score language
c 
11.5  12.0  0.000 
Test score information processing
c 
11.6  11.9  0.010 
       
2. Personal and SES variables       
       
Female    54    53  0.647 
       
Age (years)  12.6  12.6  0.000 
       
Highest education level mother 
Primary education 
Secondary education low 
Secondary education high 




















       
Highest education level father 
Primary education 
Secondary education low 
Secondary education high 













































       
























       
3. Education outcomes       
       
Ever participated in higher education  26.6  39.2  0.000 
       
Time to enrollment in higher education in years   7.07  6.56  0.000 
       
Number of pupils  1047  1106   
        a
 All numbers represent percentages, unless stated otherwise.   
b
 Vmbo includes former mavo (vmbo-tl) as well as vbo.  
c
 Test scores are of entrance tests taken in first year of secondary education. The maximum score for each test is 20.  
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            Appendix C 
This appendix provides an overview of the number of categorial and combined schools in our 
estimation sample for each of the municipality types. 
Table C.1 presents the supply-ratios of categorial schools in 1989. The first column reports 
the twelve different municipality types. For each of these types, the number of categorial and 
combined schools in our sample is reported in the second and third column, respectively. The 
last column shows the supply-ratio of tracked classes, which is defined as the number of 
categorial schools divided by the total number of schools in each municipality type.  
Equivalently, table C.2 shows the number of categorial schools, combined schools and the 
supply-ratios for the cohort 1993. 
Table C.1  Supply-ratio of categorial schools in 1989 
Municipality type  # Categorial schools  # Combined schools  Supply-ratio 
       
Countryside A1   0  0   
Countryside A2   0  0   
Countryside A3   4  1  0.80 
Countryside A4  12  0  1.00 
Urbanized countryside B1  11  1  0.92 
Urbanized countryside B2  29  5  0.85 
Specific commuter municipality B3  13  9  0.59 
Rural cities C1    7  1  0.88 
Small cities C2  17  3  0.85 
Medium-sized cities C3   5  4  0.56 
Medium-sized cities C4  12  11  0.52 
Big cities C5  25  9  0.74 
 
Table C.2  Supply-ratio of categorial schools in 1993 
Municipality type  # Categorial schools  # Combined schools  Supply-ratio 
       
Countryside A1    0    0   
Countryside A2    0    0   
Countryside A3    3    1  0.75 
Countryside A4    8     6                 0.57 
Urbanized countryside B1    9     1  0.90 
Urbanized countryside B2  17    5  0.77 
Specific commuter municipality B3  12    8  0.60 
Rural cities C1    7    2  0.78 
Small cities C2  11  14  0.44 
Medium-sized cities C3    7    5  0.58 
Medium-sized cities C4    7  12  0.37 
 